1	COURT OF APPEALS
2	STATE OF NEW YORK
3	
4	PEOPLE,
5	Respondent,
6	-against- No. 18
	NORMAN WHITEHEAD, JR.,
7	Appellant.
8	
9	20 Eagle Street Albany, New York
10	February 7, 2017
11	Before:
12	CHIEF JUDGE JANET DIFIORE ASSOCIATE JUDGE JENNY RIVERA
	ASSOCIATE JUDGE SHEILA ABDUS-SALAAM
13	ASSOCIATE JUDGE LESLIE E. STEIN ASSOCIATE JUDGE EUGENE M. FAHEY
14	ASSOCIATE JUDGE MICHAEL J. GARCIA ASSOCIATE JUDGE ROWAN D. WILSON
15	
16	Appearances:
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CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: The next matter on this afternoon's calendar is appeal number 18, the People of the State of New York v. Norman Whitehead.

Counsel.

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MR. HUG: Good afternoon, Your Honors. My name is Matthew Hug. I represent the appellant, Norman Whitehead. I would request two minutes for rebuttal.

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: You may have two minutes, sir.

MR. HUG: Your Honors, I think that the case law is clear with respect to what I guess I'll term dry possession prosecutions. In other words, criminal possession of controlled substance charges in which there is no evidence to support either the weight the element of the identity of the substance.

JUDGE GARCIA: Well, it's not no evidence, right? It's there's no drugs. So the question, I think, really is what's the evidence that there were drugs, right? Because the rule is not, and this court has never held, that you need the drugs to convict on a possession charge.

MR. HUG: I would agree, Your Honor, with the way that you framed the question. The way that I look at it is when you're looking at cases involving intercepted telephonic communications, the court's repeatedly used the phrase other evidence. Other evidence, meaning the

1 evidence, the actual evidence because if I tell you - - -2 JUDGE STEIN: What about testimony of people 3 involved in the alleged drug sales? Is that other evidence? 4 5 MR. HUG: There are cases in which it can be 6 considered other evidence, Judge. But you don't have that 7 here. Certainly, you don't have that with Counts 225 and 226. 8 9 JUDGE GARCIA: But you had cooperator testimony, 10 no? 11 MR. HUG: With respect to 225 and 226? No. You 12 do not. 13 JUDGE RIVERA: Well, so what's the only evidence 14 they put forward on 225 and 226? 15 MR. HUG: 225 and - - -16 JUDGE RIVERA: You see it - - - as you see it. 17 MR. HUG: As - - - as I see it, they tried to do 18 this kind of roundabout dance in which they say the defend --- and they --- they allege, their --- their 19 2.0 evidence is pretty sparse with respect to even this. But 2.1 they say that the defendant arranged on January 25th to go 22 down to New York City to meet with Mr. Williams. 23 he's down there, he's alleged to have sold a quantity of 2.4 cocaine to a Mr. Goodson in New York City. They presume 25 that Mr. Whitehead returns to Schenectady with yet more

cocaine, though they - - - they present no - - - no
evidence to support that. And then two days later, Mr.

Goodson returns to Schenectady apparently and lo and behold
he says while he was down in New York City I sampled a
little of that on the 25th, therefore, the defendant must
have had some more cocaine, the same batch that I sampled
back down in - - -

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JUDGE RIVERA: Well, you - - - it sounds like you're arguing what - - - that they actually needed direct evidence of this when, of course, they could have done this through circumstantial evidence. We could be looking at what are appropriate inferences. Why aren't there appropriate inferences that can be drawn? Why can't you connect these dots?

MR. HUG: Well, I think that it's ext - - - it's extremely thin, Judge, when you look at drug expert testimony, drug user testimony, you will find that in almost all of the cases it is from a sales charge in which the user, the end user, got it directly from the defendant and can say I'm familiar with the effects of cocaine. I got cocaine from the defendant on February 27th, which you don't have here. And I used it and it had the - - -

JUDGE GARCIA: That's the only evidence in those cases. It - - - it seems - - - I think what Judge Rivera is also suggesting here is you have to look at all of the

evidence surrounding the transaction. In those cases and the one where we had marijuana where it was a student and we said they didn't have enough experience to do that, that's the evidence. But here, you have a wiretap. You have surveillance. You have cooperator testimony, even in those two counts, not directly saying I bought the drugs and then I ingested them and I know the side effects of the drug. You had all of that type of testimony surrounding these transitions. So to parse it out and say you didn't have a user here may be true in those particular two counts, but we have to look at whether there was legally sufficient evidence in - - - in whole.

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MR. HUG: I disagree, Judge. I don't think that they - - - you convict someone because you've got evidence that they did something over here to say that they must have done it also over here. If you look at the - - - at count 225 and 226, there is no evidence. The evidence is interpretations by a law enforcement officer as to what was being said on a communication on the 27th, allegedly, in the County of Schenectady. And the way that they try and tie it to other evidence is to say two days earlier somebody, who is a cooperating witness with us, said that he sampled a batch of cocaine, you know, some 100-and-some miles away, and therefore the defendant still must have cocaine. There is no proof that he still had anything, if

1 he - - - if he was even in New York City with Mr. Goodson. 2 There is nothing to substantiate - - -3 JUDGE RIVERA: Other than his own attempts to 4 cook it to crack, right? 5 MR. HUG: Well, that's interpretation by an 6 investigator that when he said the term rock - - -7 JUDGE RIVERA: Again, then why isn't that - - -8 that the evidence the People have presented? The question, 9 then, is whether or not that's appropriate evidence. 10 what - - - what is wrong with that evidence to let you get 11 to those inferences? MR. HUG: Because I don't think that it's 12 13 evidence of anything more than just more of telephonic 14 evidence. It's - - - it was more Martin. You can't keep 15 piling more Martin evidence on top of Martin and Martin and 16 say, well, we've got enough now. 17 JUDGE STEIN: But when - - - when that telephone 18 - - - telephonic evidence includes statements or potential 19 admissions by the defendant himself, isn't that some - - -2.0 MR. HUG: Well - - -21 JUDGE STEIN: Isn't that evidence? 22 MR. HUG: You don't have the types of admissions 23 like you had in the marijuana case which was - - -2.4 JUDGE STEIN: Well, but when he's talking about

cooking it and - - - and that sort of thing.

MR. HUG: Well, the People point to - - - point to things like I - - - the term Rocky Balboa, but when you look at the transcripts, he's referring to this gentleman as Rocky Balboa. He's not saying, you know, did you get the Rocky Balboa, which Detective Guiry says that means crack. You know, I - - -

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JUDGE RIVERA: But that sounds like your closing argument, right? It - - - it might be enough for the jury to draw those inferences. Again, I'm asking why can't you - - - why isn't this evidence the kind that can be used to get you to connect the - - - the dots on the possession?

MR. HUG: Well, I guess a good example, Your
Honor, would be a case that the People cite which is People
v. Guidice which is 83 N.Y.2d 630 (1994). It's an assault
case. They cite to it for the proposition that telephonic
admissions can form this other evidence. So you have an
assault. Now you have a victim. The victim testified in
Guidice. He said the defendant's co - - - cohorts beat me
up. If you didn't have that, if the victim didn't exist,
you couldn't find that victim, and you have a person on a
telephone call saying I beat the crap out of that guy, I
really tuned him up, that is not enough to convict the man
for assault any more than if I explained to you right now,
Your Honor, I have eight ounces of cocaine in my - - - in
my bedroom. And you say, well, we're not even going to

1 bother going to your house, we're not going to do anything 2 else - - -3 JUDGE STEIN: But that's not all there is. And -4 - - and that - - - I think that's the problem is is that 5 we're - - - we're looking at this - - - this entire record 6 and putting things together, not each individual thing by 7 themselves. 8 MR. HUG: But your - - - you start to - - - it 9 becomes this nebulous thing, I think, Judge, when you - -10 if you go beyond - - -11 JUDGE STEIN: But - - - but I mean people - - -12 we - - - people have been convicted of murder when there's 13 no body, right? 14 MR. HUG: Yes. 15 JUDGE STEIN: Isn't that right? 16 MR. HUG: Yes. 17 JUDGE STEIN: Okay. So - - - so and in those cases, isn't it a matter of looking at the totality of the 18 19 evidence and the inferences to be drawn from that evidence 2.0 in determining whether there is enough that a rational jury 21 could find that this defendant murder this alleged victim. 22 MR. HUG: Without getting that - - -23 JUDGE STEIN: How is this different? 2.4 MR. HUG: Because in this case, it requires rank 25 speculation. Okay. The 225 charges him with having more

1 than four ounces of cocaine, and what do they provide 2 besides an interpretation of a call to support that that 3 actually existed and that that measure existed? They don't. 4 5 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Mr. Hug, on your argument 6 regarding sufficiency as to weight, was that preserved 7 below? 8 MR. HUG: As - - - as to the amount? Yes, Judge, 9 I believe it is. 10 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Where in the trial record 11 was that? 12 MR. HUG: I - - - I couldn't pinpoint an - - - an 13 exact page number, but I presume - - - I - - - it is my 14 presumption that it was included in the TOD that - - - at 15 the conclusion of the People's evidence. 16 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Unless I'm misunderstanding 17 the record, counsel, your client was convicted on seven 18 counts, and you've only dealt with two. 19 MR. HUG: Right, Judge. I think those are the 2.0 two - - - those are the two weakest charges as far as the 21 possession go, as - - - from - - - in my opinion. I think 22 that they all should fall, as I argue in my brief, but I 23 think, obviously, if Your Honors don't go with me on 225

and 226, I can't see you going with me on the remainder.

JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Okay.

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1 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you, counsel. 2 Counsel? 3 MR. HUG: Oh, I'm sorry. Thank you. I missed 4 the - - - I missed the light. 5 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Missed the light. 6 Counsel. 7 MS. FLEISCHMANN: Good - - - afternoon, Your 8 My name is Lisa Fleischmann, and I represent the 9 State in this action. May it please the court, I'd be 10 happy to take the court through the evidence supporting 11 Counts 225 and 226, and that evidence goes well beyond a 12 couple of the phone calls. 13 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: How do the People prove 14 weight without the drugs? 15 MS. FLEISCHMANN: We proved it through telephonic 16 admissions. We proved it through the eyewitness testimony 17 of Carl Goodson. For other counts within this indictment, 18 we proved it through the eyewitness testimony of Karashan 19 Mansaray. They both said that they defendant gave him - -2.0 - gave them cocaine. Both are - - - are - - - Goodson is a 21 user; he's a seller and a reseller. Mansaray is a seller 22 and a reseller. They know what cocaine is, and they both 23 testified that the defendant handed them the cocaine.

25 | JUDGE FAHEY: So - - - so - -

that's two ways - - -

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1 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: So it's your position that 2 we don't need to go through the laboratory process with 3 calibrated scales and determine the exact weight of the 4 narcotics that was possessed or sold? Is that - - -5 MS. FLEISCHMANN: Absolutely, Your Honor. 6 court has never held that that's been required, and that's 7 circumstantial proof that we've offered of the existence of 8 cocaine. In fact, this court, federal courts that I've 9 cited to, courts across the country have all held that the 10 11 JUDGE FAHEY: I don't know what to - - - I don't 12 want you to get off track here on this. 13 MS. FLEISCHMANN: Right. 14 JUDGE FAHEY: On the four ounces, on the 225 and 15 226, those are the four-ounce counts, right? 16 MS. FLEISCHMANN: Yes, Your Honor. 17 JUDGE FAHEY: All right. So I thought the - - -18 I thought the proof there was that there was 120 grams that 19 we held out, cooked up into crack, and that's the proof of 2.0 the four ounces? 21 MS. FLEISCHMANN: Correct. 22 JUDGE FAHEY: Okay. So the four ounces comes 23 from the 120 grams. That's where the number comes from, 2.4 right?

MS. FLEISCHMANN:

That's correct, Your Honor.

1 JUDGE FAHEY: And, of course, but that relies on 2 - - - purely on Goodson's testimony, right? 3 MS. FLEISCHMANN: That relies on Goodson's 4 testimony and also on the testimony throughout the trial 5 that shows that the defendant has familiarity with weight. 6 JUDGE FAHEY: Um-hum. 7 MS. FLEISCHMANN: He talks about weight with 8 respect - - - I'm sorry, Your Honor. Go ahead. 9 JUDGE FAHEY: No. That's fine. I'm listening to 10 I'm just mumbling to myself. you. 11 MS. FLEISCHMANN: Okay. 12 JUDGE FAHEY: Don't pay any attention to me, you 13 Ignore that man, you know. know. 14 MS. FLEISCHMANN: For the very - - -15 JUDGE FAHEY: All right. 16 MS. FLEISCHMANN: Go ahead. 17 JUDGE FAHEY: The second - - - the second counts I'm - - - I'm kind of curious about are 228 and 229. 18 19 228 and 229, the proof there is Mansaray, who wasn't a 2.0 user, doesn't know if he's selling coke or not by his own 21 admission and didn't test it himself, just by what he'd 22 been told. You have the testimony of somebody named 23 Johnson, right? 24 MS. FLEISCHMANN: Yes. 25 JUDGE FAHEY: Who said he was "pretty sure"

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MS. FLEISCHMANN: Yes.

JUDGE FAHEY: - - - that it was. So you're saying "pretty sure" is legally sufficient?

MS. FLEISCHMANN: I'm saying more than that.

JUDGE FAHEY: Okay. Go ahead.

MS. FLEISCHMANN: "Pretty sure" were the words that Darren Johnson said, and he did testify, Darren Johnson, at trial that he is a user; he's a seller and a reseller. What happened here was Karashan Mansaray on the day, the 27th, made phone calls and said to people stuff is pretty dried up out here. I don't have anything. So Johnson calls him and somebody named Roosevelt Cobb calls him. And Mansaray can you hold on, can you hold on? It's coming this evening. And then along comes the defendant with the half kilo and Mansaray testifies that he distributed that cocaine to Roosevelt Cobb, another - - -

JUDGE FAHEY: So let me stop you.

MS. FLEISCHMANN: Um-hum.

JUDGE FAHEY: He never tested it. He doesn't - - he's assuming that it's coke, but he - - - he doesn't
know it's coke, so he's not sufficient. Mansaray is not
sufficient to establish that it's coke.

MS. FLEISCHMANN: Right. And we're not relying on his user testimony.

1 JUDGE FAHEY: All right. Okay. 2 MS. FLEISCHMANN: It's Johnson's testimony that 3 we are. 4 JUDGE FAHEY: And you're - - - so you are saying 5 that "pretty sure" - - - he used it later that evening and he's "pretty sure" it was the same stuff. He doesn't know. 6 7 He was smoking it up? 8 MS. FLEISCHMANN: Yes. "Pretty sure." We're 9 saying he - - - it's almost a certainty that he did have 10 that cocaine from that half kilo. That was the cocaine 11 that Mansaray had. From the nature of the - - -12 JUDGE FAHEY: Is there any other proof that you 13 can point to in the record besides "pretty sure"? 14 MS. FLEISCHMANN: The communications that 15 Mansaray had with - - -16 JUDGE FAHEY: Let me just stop you - - -17 MS. FLEISCHMANN: Go ahead. 18 JUDGE FAHEY: - - - just so I'm clear. 19 Telephone communications is - - -2.0 MS. FLEISCHMANN: Yes. These are telephone-2.1 intercepted communications. And Johnson was looking for 22 cocaine at 6:02 p.m. that night, and the defendant came in 23 an hour later with the half kilo. And Mansaray was saying 2.4 hold on. It's coming. And he told another person who

called, as well, making an inquiry about cocaine, and

Mansaray said it's coming this evening. So it was clear - a clear, rational inference that a jury - - - jury can
make from this evidence is that Mansaray had nothing and
then it came in, and then it was distributed. And then
we've got Johnson saying he's "pretty sure" that he sampled
Mansaray's cocaine from that evening. He got cocaine from
Mansaray that evening. And then he testified, as well,
Johnson, that is, that every time he used Mansaray's
cocaine it was cocaine. So considering all of that
together, that is sufficient evidence, legally sufficient
evidence, to demonstrate that the substance was, in fact,
cocaine. Moving back - - -

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JUDGE RIVERA: At what point would - - - would Goodson's statement be just too uncertain? You say "pretty sure" is - - is good enough, but at what point is it now just too uncertain?

MS. FLEISCHMANN: Goodson was certain. Goodson said that he sampled the very cocaine that he got from the defendant in New York City, and he also - - - let me back up for a second. With regard to those two charges, somebody mentioned, I believe Your Honor, connecting the dots. Let me connect the dots for this court. With respect to those charges, Goodson testified that the defendant gave him cocaine on the 25th.

The next day, the two gentlemen are back up in

upstate New York, and they're talking over the phone. And they're giddy. They love the quality of this stuff. It's wonderful, pure, shiny stuff. Those are the words that are being used. Goodson testifies that he's talking about the quality of the cocaine. It's very clear from the context that the two gentlemen are talking about the very same parcel of cocaine and their respective pieces of it.

Because one says that stuff's so shiny. The other says, yeah, I know. I'm looking at it. Goodson testified that they were talking about the cocaine that they both got on the 25th.

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On the 27th, the defendant says to Karashan

Mansaray I cooked up a buck twenty last night that I

brought back, and a jury can rationally infer that he's

talking about the cocaine that he brought back from New

York City. He is also talking about that cocaine because

he said he cooked it up. And he and Goodson on the 26th

were talking about cooking up cocaine. Rocky Balboa,

Goodson testified, was a reference to the fact that rock

comes - - crack comes in rock form. They also called

each other Chef Boyardee and they made various jokes about

cooking. Viewing all of this evidence together, that

connects the dots so that any rational jury can conclude

that the defendant possessed cocaine on the 27th and

possessed it with the intent to sell because he offered it

to Mansaray.

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I'd like to point out a couple of things that
were discussed. The legal sufficiency of the evidence of
the weight was not a part of the trial order of dismissal.
I'd note that that's, I believe, at pages A-526 and 527, I
believe is the trial order of dismissal. I would ask the
court to take a look at pages A-518 and 519 and SA-350.
That's the testimony of Carl Goodson in which he explains
that he sampled the drugs that Mr that the defendant
gave him and also that when they were talking about cooking
up drugs, they were talking about the the drugs that
they got from New York City on the 25th. So viewing the
evidence rationally, viewing

JUDGE RIVERA: So if the - - - the witness who's a drug user just gets up and says I'm a drug user and says, oh, I know this was cocaine because I - - - I used it - - -

MS. FLEISCHMANN: Yes.

JUDGE RIVERA: - - - it - - - how much - - - how much experience as a drug user does that witness have to have?

MS. FLEISCHMANN: You have to lay a foundation.

The - - - the witness does not have to be an expert.

There's no law that requires the witness to be an expert.

The Appellate Division cases that I relied on, the witnesses were not adjudicated experts. But there has to

1 be - - -JUDGE RIVERA: Well, they don't have to be a 2 3 scientific expert, but there has to be basis by which the 4 person can communicate that, in their experience, this drug 5 that they've ingested or that they've been in contact with 6 they can testify to, under oath, their belief is that it's 7 cocaine. 8 MS. FLEISCHMANN: Yes. What the prosecutor must 9 do is lay a foundation with the witness, and that is 10 exactly what the prosecutor did here. 11 JUDGE RIVERA: All right. So what - - - so 12 that's what I'm saying. So what if the drug user says I 13 smoked crack once? 14 MS. FLEISCHMANN: He testified, Goodson - - -15 JUDGE RIVERA: No. I understand, but I'm asking 16 you where to draw that line. 17 MS. FLEISCHMANN: Oh - - -18 JUDGE RIVERA: Where do you draw the line? 19 MS. FLEISCHMANN: I would say you would - - -2.0 JUDGE RIVERA: Once? Twice? 21 MS. FLEISCHMANN: I would say many times. 22 JUDGE RIVERA: Years? 23 MS. FLEISCHMANN: I would - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: An addict?

MS. FLEISCHMANN: Years, addict for user, I would

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say, or frequent user, near addict, somebody who has used it in more than a recreational way, perhaps. Here - - -

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you, Ms. Fleischmann.

MS. FLEISCHMANN: Yes.

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you.

MS. FLEISCHMANN: Thank you, Your Honor.

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: You're welcome.

Mr. Hug.

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MR. HUG: Yes. Your Honors, briefly, with respect to the other possession counts, that being 228 and Counsel just acknowledged that Mansaray's alone was not enough to demonstrate that this was cocaine. like to direct Your Honors to the respondent's brief at page 66, which deals with Darren Johnson. And what you see is that there's a conversation that's allegedly had between Mansaray and Johnson in which Johnson is allegedly requesting a product or cocaine from Mansaray. Mansaray says I don't have it. Then the thread is left because there is zero proof. In fact, the proof is - - - belies their point that Johnson ever got cocaine that day or, you know, in the subsequent days from Mansaray. Mansaray, according to their brief, says that he sold it to people that were underneath like Cobb, William, Hyde (ph.), and others. He doesn't say, and there are no phone calls to substantiate, that Johnson ever got his hands on any

1 cocaine that came from Mansaray on February 27th or 28th or 2 29th, for that matter. 3 JUDGE FAHEY: Let me ask you one point just to -4 - - it's on a slightly different topic, and I don't want to 5 forget it. You - - - you argued that in the opening the 6 use of the legal meaning of the word sale was discussed 7 improperly by counsel. 8 MR. HUG: Yes. 9 JUDGE FAHEY: What - - - let's assume it was. 10 Why isn't this simply an abuse of discretion standard? 11 What - - - what remedy are you asking for? 12 MR. HUG: Judge, I think the - - - I'm asking for 13 it to be remanded - - - reversed and remanded for a new 14 trial. 15 JUDGE FAHEY: On that issue alone? 16 MR. HUG: If - - - if need be. Yes, Judge. I 17 think that that - - - that so reduced the burden of proof 18 on the - - - on the People, with respect to at least the 19 sales counts, that, yes. That kind of bottom line of a - -2.0 - an offer is a sale is - - is wrong, and the judge 21 should not have permitted it and should have stepped in and 22 given a curative instruction. 23 JUDGE FAHEY: But you're saying that the instruct 2.4

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Mr. Hug, you also raised a

challenge to the eavesdropping order and the propriety of the eavesdropping order.

MR. HUG: Yes.

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CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Do you care to use some of your time to address that?

MR. HUG: Certainly, Judge. And the People pointed out that there are some preservation issues with that. I think that the defense pointed out, at the very least, that the main error that they pointed out was that the March warrant, which would have been the second warrant that included Mr. Whitehead, was based upon both intentional and at least reckless misstatements of facts by Investigator Sauter and when - - when he stated unequivocally that he reviewed a video surveillance of an interaction between Mr. Whitehead and Mr. Williams at the Woodbury Commons and definitively saw a bag, a large bag, containing a white powdery substance. That's false. That was a bottle of windshield wiper fluid.

Where it goes into the intentional misstatement of fact was when he said that Detective Plante told me he saw it, too, when he was there, and Detective Plante testified that that simply wasn't true. So in - - in addition to that, which I think is the more fundamental error, is - - is that the court and - - well, the prosecutor kept extending, expanding this warrant, this

1 eavesdropping warrant through amendment, ultimately through 2 a terminated amendment making it somewhat like a zombie 3 eavesdropping warrant that just was never going to end, and 4 they were just adding more and more people instead of - - -5 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: You're suggesting that the 6 order that ultimately authorized going up on the 7 defendant's phone was an amendment, it wasn't an - - - a 8 new order to go up on that defendant's phone? 9 MR. HUG: That's exactly what I'm saying, Judge. 10 When you look at the applications and the orders that followed - - -11 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: I saw what it said. Yeah. 12 13 MR. HUG: - - - they're all amending that 14 initial - - -15 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: I know what it said, but 16 I'm going to the substance of what it accomplished. 17 MR. HUG: I - - - I'm saying yes. In - - - in 18 substance and in form, which as this court has - - - has 19 repeatedly said that this eavesdropping statute must be 20 meticulously followed - - -21 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Indeed. 22 MR. HUG: - - - and closely read. And if you 23 look at Professor Prizer's (ph.) commentaries, he 2.4 specifically - - - advised that this is an improper 25 procedure. That if you - - - that the CPL permits

1	amendment like a plain view amendment. So if I'm if
2	I've got authorization to listen to guns and they're
3	talking about cocaine, I can go and I can amend that
4	warrant so I can listen to the cocaine. It doesn't say I
5	can keep amending it and adding one, two, three, four, oh,
6	person number four is talking to five, I want to talk to
7	number five. The procedure is to go get a
8	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: That's assuming it's an
9	amendment. Judge Garcia, did you have a question?
10	JUDGE GARCIA: No. I don't.
11	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Okay. Thank you, sir.
12	MR. HUG: Thank you, Judges.
13	(Court is adjourned)
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CERTIFICATION I, Sara Winkeljohn, certify that the foregoing transcript of proceedings in the Court of Appeals of People v. Norman Whitehead, Jr., No. 18 was prepared using the required transcription equipment and is a true and accurate record of the proceedings. Congleric Good Signature: Agency Name: eScribers Address of Agency: 352 Seventh Avenue Suite 604 New York, NY 10001 Date: February 12, 2017

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